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J URISDICTION
T h e b a s i s for thi s court's jurisdiction I s set forth i n
Roberts1

petition.
CONTROLLING
Ru ] e 4,3(4)

PROVISIONS

Rules of t-i^ Ut..- ' jp: i

_ _ . •

R e v i e w by a w r i t of certiorari is u
, mattei
r i g h t , b u t of judicial d i s c r e t i o n , and w i l l be
t m j
only w h e n there are special and important reas- :
t h e r e f o r . T h e following, w h i l e neither controlling :.or
w h o l l y m e a s u r i n g the court's d i s c r e t i o n , indicates t.:e
c h a r a c t e r of reasons tha/ ; l1
• re n<=,: dr-rr-d :
(4) Whei I the C o u n oi A p p e a l s Lab q u e s t i o n of rn.unici.pal, s t a t e , or f*not b e e n , b u t should b e , settled L2

-] -

an important
. <** v:} * ch h a s
s coai_.

2.

Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 56

and 57 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely
fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court from
considering their merits on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the Roberts' use of their agriculturally
zoned property, on which they reside in Centerville City, Utah,
to store approximately thirty junked or inoperable motor
vehicles.

Pursuant to its ordinances which prohibit such use of

property within the City limits, Centerville City pursued civil
and criminal avenues of relief in its efforts to obtain ordinance
compliance and removal of the motor vehicles.
Petitioners refuse and still refuse to remove the junked or
inoperable motor vehicles from their property claiming the
vehicles constitute a prior nonconforming use exempting them from
Centerville's ordinances.1

(Petition, at 4).

Twelve years

before petitioners even purchased their property, however,
Centerville Ordinances precluded the storage of junked,
inoperable or partially dismantled motor vehicles.

x

(Petition,

In the district court and Court of Appeals, petitioners
also asserted the storage of junked or inoperable motor vehicles
constituted a valid agricultural accessory use to their residence
in an agricultural zone. (Petition, Appendix "A" at 2.) Both
courts denied the claim as a matter of law and petitioners do not
raise the issue in their petition for a writ of certiorari.
-2-

Appendix "D" at 6). 2

Such storage is still prohibited to this

date.
Using the same flawed nonconforming use argument, the
Roberts filed a complaint to enjoin the City's use of criminal
prosecutions to obtain removal of the dismantled and inoperable
motor vehicles.

(Petition, Appendix "A" at 1).

While that case was pending, the Roberts submitted to
Centerville1s zoning administrator an affidavit declaring the use
of their property for junked vehicle storage to be a valid prior
nonconforming use.

The zoning administrator disagreed.

Petitioners appealed to the City's Board of Adjustment which
affirmed the decision since City ordinances precluded Roberts1
use twelve years before they purchased the property.

(Petition,

Appendix "A" at 1-2). In a separate complaint, petitioners
appealed the Board's decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-15 as arbitrary and capricious.3

That complaint was

subsequently amended, adding allegations that Roberts' use of
2

In 1952, Centerville City defined "junk yard" as "the use
of any lot . . . for the storage, keeping or abandonment of junk,
including . . . the dismantling, demolition or abandonment of
automobiles, or other vehicles . . . or parts thereof."
(Petition, Appendix "D" at 2). Junk yards are not a permitted
use in the zone in which Petitioners' property is located. (Id.
at 6) .
3

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 provides in part:

The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the
Board of Adjustment may have and maintain a plenary
action for relief therefrom in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
-3-

their property constituted a valid prior nonconforming use and
the Board lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a nonconforming use existed.

(Petition, Appendix "AM at 2).

The Roberts then amended their original complaint to enjoin
further criminal enforcement by adding the same nonconforming use
argument as a basis for a declaratory judgment.
Because both complaints centered on whether petitioners
possessed a valid prior nonconforming use, the parties stipulated
to their consolidation.

(Petition, Appendix "A" at 2).

Petitioners then filed a "Second Amended Complaint1' in the
consolidated action setting forth, for purposes of this Petition,
only three issues: whether the Roberts possessed a nonconforming
use, whether the Board of Adjustment acted arbitrarily in denying
petitioners1 request for recognition of a nonconforming use, and
whether the board lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence
of a nonconforming use.

(Petition, Appendix "A" at 2).

Together with an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint,
respondents filed a counterclaim requesting a judicial declaration that Roberts1 use of their property did not constitute a
nonconforming use and an injunction mandating removal of the
vehicles.

Simultaneously, respondents moved to dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint and for summary judgment on the counterclaim.

After complete briefing and a hearing on December 13,

1989, the district court granted respondents1 motions in full
ruling that a nonconforming use did not exist, the "Board of

-4-

Adjustment had authority to act and [its] decision was reasonable" and ordered immediate removal of the vehicles.

(Petition,

Appendix "A" at 3).
Just prior to petitioners1 notice of appeal, their counsel
of record withdrew.

One of the petitioners, J. Val Roberts, an

attorney himself, then filed the notice of appeal and docketing
statement pro se.

(Exhs. 1 & 2 to this Brief).

The issues

raised on appeal, however, far exceeded those pursued before the
district court.

For example, petitioners asserted for the first

time denial of access to the courts, a claim under recent amendments to the Horseless Carriage Act, facial challenges to
Centerville1s ordinances, as well as allegations of equal
protection violations, a "selective prosecution" claim, improper
ordinance enforcement motives, violation of the Junk Yard Control
Act and the separation of powers doctrine.

(Exhibit 2 to this

Brief).
Because most of the issues on appeal were not raised in the
trial court and thus waived, and it is frivolous to assert a
prior nonconforming use exists when the use was prohibited twelve
years prior to purchase of the property, respondents moved for
summary affirmance pursuant to Rule 10(a)(2), Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

The motion was fully briefed and assigned to the

Court of Appeals which granted it on May 2, 1990.
Appendix "A").

(Petition,

It is from that decision which petitioners seek a

writ of certiorari.

-5-

The Court of Appeals held that "even construing the facts in
the light most favorable to [petitioners] we can identify no
genuine factual dispute about the use of the property."
(Petition, Appendix "A" at 5).

"It is undisputed that

[petitioners] purchased their property after the enactment of the
zoning ordinance and thus cannot claim a prior nonconforming
Id.4

use."

The Roberts now petition this court pursuant to Rules 4248, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, for a writ of certiorari to
the Court of Appeals.

They allege their petition "raises impor-

tant constitutional questions under both the Utah and the United
States Constitutions."

(Petition, at 7.)

Those important

constitutional questions are whether the court of appeals erred
in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in spite
of (1) the nineteen year old newspaper article referencing
another district court decision which petitioners provided the
Court of Appeals but not the district court, (Petition, Exhibit

4

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the district courtfs
finding that as a matter of law petitioners did not possess a
valid agricultural accessory use either. Again this issue is not
raised in the petition. Nonetheless, it is undisputed in the
record that an accessory use did not exist. To be a permissible
accessory use, the storage of inoperable motor vehicles must be
customarily incidental to the "main use" of the property which
must be agricultural. The record indicates the main use petitioners make of their property is residential. In addition,
petitioners keep a few "cattle, pigs and chicken," (Petition, at
17), but the "keeping or raising of domestic animals and fowl" is
excluded from the ordinance's definition of agriculture.
(Petition, Appendix "D" at 1).
-6-

"F") and (2) the April 23, 1990 enactment of statutes providing
for the issuance of "optional certificates of title" for "collector motor vehicles."

(Petition, Exhibit "E.")

The third impor-

tant constitutional question is whether the Court of Appeals
erred by "failing to recognize," even though it was not raised in
the trial court, the alleged improper motives of respondents in
enforcing their ordinances.

The fourth question asserts the

Court of Appeals should have required the trial court to interrogate counsel regarding allegedly disputed facts, none of which
are material, even though the trial court rendered its decision
as a matter of law based on undisputed facts.
ARGUMENT
PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY
SPECIAL REASONS OR IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF LAW
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE EXERCISE OF THIS
COURT'S DISCRETION IN REVIEWING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS BY A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI.
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, allows review of a
judicial decision "only when there are special and important
reasons therefor."

One such reason, which petitioners here

advance, is "when the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of municipal, state or federal law which has not, but
should be, settled by this Court."

A review of the record below,

however, establishes that this case fails to present any "special
or important" questions of law which should be decided by this
court.

-7-

First, the Court of Appeals did not decide "an important
question of municipal, state or federal law."

It merely affirmed

the trial court's grant of summary judgment to respondents.

The

Roberts premised their entire case in the trial court on the
existence of a nonconforming use or an agricultural accessory
use.

The district court record indicates there were no disputed

issues of material fact and judgment on those issues as a matter
of law was warranted.

The Roberts purchased their property after

the ordinances in question were enacted and the main use of their
property is residential, not agricultural.
Second, any other issues presented to the Court of Appeals
or this Court are raised for the first time and are therefore
impermissible bases of review.

"It is axiomatic that . . .

issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are
deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their
merits on appeal."

Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 111 Utah Adv.

Rep. 55, 56 and 57 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Berqer v. Minnesota
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1986).
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must
present his entire case and his theory or theories to
the trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some different theory and thus attempt
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation.
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970).
In petitioners1 first question, they assert the trial court
and the Court of Appeals decisions are in direct conflict with a

-8-

1971 district court decision.

The alleged decision and the

newspaper article referencing the decision, even if properly
portrayed by petitioners, were never raised until consideration
by the Court of Appeals.
The second question presented by petitioners claims several
statutes with an effective date of April 23, 1990 and no reference to being retroactive, permit, "by implication," petitioners
to store any number of collectable motor vehicles they like on
their property without government regulation.

Again assuming

petitioners1 characterization of the statutes to be accurate, the
argument was not made, and cannot be made because of the effective date, to the district court or the Court of Appeals.5
Petitioners1 third question proposed for review is whether
the Court of Appeals improperly failed to recognize respondents1
alleged improper motives in enforcing Centerville1s zoning
ordinances.

The Court of Appeals did not decide the issue

because it was not presented to the trial court.

(Petitioners,

Appendix "A" at 3).
The fourth issue purporting to justify a writ of certiorari
is the failure of the Court of Appeals to require the trial court

Petitioners' second question also asserts that federal
takings and equal protection laws are implicated in this matter.
A federal takings claim was initiated in one of Roberts' original
complaints dated January 13, 1988. That complaint was subsequently amended on October 4, 1989 and the takings claim was
dropped and never resurrected. None of the complaints have ever
raised an equal protection claim.
-9-

to interrogate counsel regarding any possible issues of fact,
even though it decided the case as a matter of law and on undisputed facts.

Not only was this issue not raised before the trial

court, but it was not presented to the Court of Appeals either.
Finally, none of the issues raised in the petition are
meritorious.

The 1971 district court decision relied on by the

Roberts exists only in the form of a newspaper article which
distinguishes itself from the present matter.

The automobile

collector in the article purchased his property and began storing
vehicles in 1941, sixteen years prior to the effective date of
the zoning ordinances enforced against him.
fI

F").

(Petition, Appendix

The Roberts began their collecting after the zoning

ordinances in question took effect.
The 1990 statutes relied on by petitioners also fail to
support their claims.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-195-198 only

provide that collector motor vehicles may be titled in a form
different than other motor vehicles.

They do not, as argued by

the Roberts, allow collectors to store any number of motor
vehicles on their property without government regulation.

A

municipality's police power allows it to regulate the use to
which real property within its limits is put.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 10-9-1.
It is also irrelevant that the trial court did not inquire
of trial counsel whether any facts were in dispute.

It was

undisputed that petitioners purchased their property after the

-10-

storage of inoperable motor vehicles was prohibited in
Centerville, and the main use of Roberts1 property was residential.

As a matter of law then, petitioners did not possess a

nonconforming use or an agricultural accessory use.

Furthermore,

petitioners did not file a 56(f) affidavit with the district
court stating the need for additional discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request
that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be denied.
DATED this

SO K day of

\&AL\^

1990.

SNOW/CHftlSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

K /^wiJ^

By

Jody Kf Burmett
Daniel D. Hill
Attorneys for Respondents
DDH318

-11-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of July, 1990, I
caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing to be served
by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on counsel for plaintiffs
as follows:
J. Val Roberts, Pro Se
P. 0. Box 666
Centerville, UT 84014
DATED

this

Ijf/Ntay of July, 1990

Jody
Snow, Chti/st&hsen & Martineau
Attorneys^for Defendants/Respondents
Centerville City

COPY
J. Val Roberts
62772
Attorney Pro Se and
Attorney for Plaintiff, Verle Roberts
P. 0. Box 666
Centerville, Utah 84014
Telephone (801) 295-9003
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
J. VAL ROBERTS and
VERLE ROBERTS,

:
:
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

:

CENTERVILLE CITY, CENTERVILLE
CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, and
NANCY H. GROLL, Chairman of
the Centerville City Board of
Adjustment, WILLIAM WINGO, NORM
WRIGHT, FRED NELSON, and DALE
REES, members of the Centerville
City Board of Adjustment,
Defendants-

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. §9-0903165
The Honorable David Roth

C0ME5 NOW J. VAL ROBERTS, attorney at law, and gives notice,
in accordance with Rule 3d of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
that he, appearing as a pro se PIaintiff/Appellant and as counsel
for his wife, VERLE ROBERTS, Co-Plaintiff and Appellant, does
appeal from the final order of the HONORABLE DAVID ROTH entered
January 2, 1990, granting Defendants, the CITY OF CENTERVILLE,
UTAH'S Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Plaintiffsaction against the Defendants for an unlawful taking of real
property in connection with Plaintiffs* prior existing,
nonconforming use and from the final order affirming a like action
of the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S alleged right to determine a

EXHIBIT 1

none on-forming use thereby denying Plaintiffs access to judicial
review by evidentiary hearing and permitting the Defendants to
take a portion of Plamtiffs" real property without compensation
in violation of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the
Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.
The Court's final order granting Defendants summary judgment
places the Weber County Division of the Second District Court in
direct conflict with an 18-year-old decision of the Davis County
Division of the Second District Court which established a
nonconforming use in circumstances squarely on all fours with the
facts in the case at bar.
Dated this 26th day of January, 1990.

J. VAL ROBERTS
Attorney at Law
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, this _26th_ day of
January, 1990, to the following:

Jody Burnett and Daniel D. Hill,

Attorneys for Defendants, P. 0. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah
B4145.

J. VAL ROBERTS
Attorney at Law

-2-

J. Val Roberts
G2772
Attorney Pro Se and
Attorney for Plaintiff, Verle Roberts
P. 0. Box 666
Centerville, Utah 84014
Telephone (801) 295-9003

Fu6 I 5 1990
Clerk, Suprecr^Couit u«J/

UTAH SUPREME COURT

J. VAL ROBERTS and
VERLE ROBERTS,
DOCKETING STATEMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CENTERVILLE CITY, CENTERVILLE
CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, and
NANCY H. GRQLL, Chairman of
the Centerville City Board of
Adjustment, WILLIAM WINGQ, NORM
WRIGHT, FRED NELSON, and DALE
REES, members of the Centerville
City Board of Adjustment,

Case No,

Civil No. 89-0903165

Defendants.

COMES NOW, J, VAL ROBERTS, Attorney at Law, acting pro se anc
as counsel for Coappel1 ant, VERLE ROBERTS, and hereby files a
docketing statement in accordance with Rule 9(a) of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court.
1.

The date of the order appealed from is January 2, 1990,

wherein the HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, a Judge of the District Court
of the Second Judicial District in and for Weber County, State of
Utah, granted summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' action
against the Defendants for the unlawful taking of real property in
connection with the Plaintiffs" prior existing, nonconforming use
and from a parallel order for summary judgment against the
Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendant, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT.
EXHIBIT 2

a-f-firrning the De-fendant Board's alleged right to determine the
existence or nonexistence o-f the Plainti-f-fs'

noncon-f orming use

which, as construed, has denied the Plainti-f-fs the right to have a
court o-f law determine whether or not the City ordinance grants
the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT the authority to determine, by hearing,
the existence or nonexistence o-f any noncon-forming use within the
con-fines o-f CENTERVILLE CITY by administrative review or whether
the ordinance does not, in -fact, limit the authority o-f the BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT to receiving property owners" a-f-fidavits o-f
noncon-f orming use and, therea-fter, recommending to the City
Council which o-f the claims received by the BOARD should be
litigated in the District Court.

As applied, the summary judgment

decision o-f the HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH denies the Plainti-f-fs
access to the District Courts o-f the State on substantial property
issues and has permitted the De-fendant, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, to
acquire certain substantial property rights o-f the Plainti-f-fs
without paying compensation in violation o-f the Constitution o-f
the State o-f Utah and the Fi-fth Amendment o-f the United States
Consti tution.
2-

The Order granting summary judgment -from which the

Plaintiffs appeal places the Weber County Division o-f the Second
District Court in the position o-f having a diametrically opposed
conflict with a decision which has been the law in the Second
District regarding inoperable, partially dismantled, and rusty
automobiles owned by a private collector -for more then EIGHTEEN
U S ) years, JUDGE THORNLEV K. SWAN o-f the Davis County Division
o-f the Second District having rendered a decision against the CITY

OF FARMINGTON, UTAH, and in -favor of MELVIN HELD, SR. regarding
the alleged violation by MR. HELD o-f a FARMINGTON CITY ordinance
enacted at substantially the same time and -form as the CENTERVILLE
CITY ordinance complained o-f in the case at bar and purporting to
modify the rights o-f the defendant/col lector to store antique,
rusted, partially dismantled automobiles which were no longer
manu-factured and which the defendant m

the FARMINGTON CITY case

brought onto the property at a time when it was zoned agricultural
and did not specifically provide for the storing o-f "THREE (3) "
antique automobiles as an accessory use to its agricultural
classification.

In re-fusing to take evidence and entering a

summary judgment order in -favor o-f the Defendants, the Court has
relied upon a case -from the State o-f Colorado, there being no such
cases in Utah, and has, thereby, substantially changed the legal
precedent relied on by Plaintiffs for EIGHTEEN (18) years in
assembling their private collection of automobiles, established a
conflict between two divisions of the same district court on
identical facts, and abused its discretion by not conducting a
hearing on the issues of fact that exist.
3.

The Plaintiffs in the case at bar have detrimentally

relied upon the law as it has existed in the southern portion of
the Second Judicial District since first taking note of the
newspaper accounts of JUDGE THORNLEY l< . SWAN on August 16, 1971,
and subsequent there unto in that the Plaintiffs have assembled
some 30 collector's automobiles having a value in their restored
condition in excess of $250,000.00 and will be deprived of

substantial property rights unless the District Court is reversed.
(See Exhibit "A," newspaper article.)

<NOTE also additional

newspaper articles citing the ruling by JUDGE THORNLEY K. SWAN o-f
the Second District Court will be supplied as an additional
exhibit to this Docketing Statement.)
4.

The Lower Court's abuse o-f discretion in granting the

Defendants summary judgment has, as to the Plainti-f-fs in the case
at bar, denied them the rights and bene-fits con-ferred upon other
citizens o-f the State o-f* Utah under the Utah Horseless Carriage
Act, Section 41-21-1 UCA 1954 as amended 1975 and will, i-f not
reversed by this Honorable Court, deny the Plainti-f-fs the right to
continue to store a 1941 Ford -flathead V-8 pickup truck and a
1954 -flathead V-S one-ton truck on their property until such time
as the Plainti-f-fs shall render the same operation.

The -full text

o-f the Statute invalidated as to the Plaintit-fs by the Court's
summary judgment order is set out hereafter:
41-21-1.
de-f i ned.

"Utah

Horseless

Carriage"

"Any motor vehicle which is thirty
years or older, -from the current year,
primarily a collector's item, and used
-for participation in club activities,
exhibitions, tours, parades, occasional
transportation, and similar uses, but
which
is
not
-for
general
daily
transportation, shall, -for the purposes
o-f this act,
be known as a "'Utah
Horseless Carriage."
41-21-2.
"Registration—fees-A-f-f idavi t-A-f-fidavit—Certi-ficate—License plates.
" (1)
In
lieu
o-f
the
annual
registration -fees
levied in Section
41-1-127, the registration -fees -for any
"Utah Horseless Carriage" shall be *10,
-4-

but no annual renewal of registration
shall be required, "-***•
5.

The ordinance of CENTERVILLE CITY which is complained of

in this appeal in its several versions which -forbid the storage o-f
inoperable or partially dismantled or rusty motor vehicles,
whether -for a period in excess o-f SEVEN <7) day or in excess o-f
THIRTY (30) days, is unconstitutionally restrictive and over broad
as it has been applied to the Plamti-f-fs in the case at bar.

It

cannot be seriously maintained by the Defendants, by the District
Court Judge in the Lower Court, or by any mature person remotely
-familiar with the construction, operation, or maintenance o-f
either horseless carriages, antique cars, or classic automobiles
such as the Plaintiffs' THREE (3) Karman Ghias that the same
either can or should be stored and maintained in totally
operational and rust iree

condition for the THIRTY (30) years

required by Section 41-21-1 UCA 1953 as amended 1Q75 while they
are waiting to qualifv with the 30-year provision of the Statute
even if the large quantities of road salt common in Utah during
the winter months were not used in Centerviile.
Cn

The ordinance, as applied, not only negates the Statute

but sets conditions which cannot be complied with in the year—toyear ownership of the majority of foreign-made motor vehicles when
parts must be shipped from Germany or Japan: and the same is
unconstitutionally vague and over broad in its application to
Plaintiffs.
7.

According to the published deposition of RANDY RANDALL,

CENTEFVILLE CITY had never enforced its ordinance prohibiting the

storage o-f rusted, inoperable, or partially dismantled vehicles
against any o-f the citizens o-f the City until he was directed by
the then City Council to initiate investigation and prosecution o-f
the Plamti-f-fs in the case at bar by criminal action beginning in
19B4 and being ongoing to the present, the Plamti-f-f, VERLE
ROBERTS, having been -found guilty o-f violation o-f the ordinance by
a Circuit Court Judge and subjected to a -fine o-f *100.00
notwithstanding the sworn testimony that she owned none o-f the
vehicles individually or jointly with the Plamti-f-f, J. VAL
ROBERTS, and that she was incapable o-f criminal intent.

So -far as

is known to the Plamti-f-f/appel 1 ants in the case at bar, during
the ensuing SIX <o) years "from the initiation o-f their prosecution
to the present, no other person in the con-fines o-f CENTEPVILLE
CI TV has been subjected to criminal sanctions -for the storage o-f
rusted, inoperable, or partially dismantled vehicles
notwithstanding the juaicial con-fession o-f CAFL F. ALLEN, JP. , at
the Appellant. VEPLE POBEFTS^S, criminal trial that he had at that
date, and had maintained -for the previous THREE (3) years, an
inoperable and partially dismantled Honda motor vehicle on his
property which property abuts the Plamti-F-f/Appel lants" property
to the north.

This Honorable Court should not only remand the

F lainti-f-f /Appel 1 ants' civil action -for a -full evidentiary hearing,
it should issue an injunction against the CITV as to the
automobiles presently stored on the PI ainti-f-f/Appel lants^ property
and any -further prosecution bv criminal action until this matter
shall be resolved on its merits.
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8.

In order -for a city zoning ordinance to be a valid means

o-f limiting or extinguishing a nonconforming use, there must be
some zone or location within the city which, by definition,
permits the prior activity to be lawfully conducted.

The

published deposition o-f RANDY RANDALL states that there is no
place in the City o-f Centerville where MR. ROBERTS may store his
private collection o-f rusted, inoperable, or partially dismantled
motor vehicles.

The ordinance is, therefore, an unconstitutional

taking o-f private property rights without compensation, and the
ordinance is not constitutionally enforceable against any resident
of the City in any of its prior or present forms.
9.

The actions of the Defendants in the case at bar

constitute a de facto repeal of all of the ordinances dealing with
the storage of partially dismantled, rusted, or inoperable
vehicles within the confines of the CITY DF CENTERVILLE as well as
selective prosecution by the CITY of the PIaintiff/Appel1 ants
herein which, as applied, denies the Plaintiffs equal protection
of the law guaranteed under both the United States and the Utah
Constitutions; and this Honorable Court should not only vacate the
District Court's permanent injunction and order on appeal, but
should grant the Plaintiffs summary judgment against the
Defendants as to the Plaintiffs'1 nonconforming use and the de
facto repeal o-f the offending CITY ordinances.

The Plaintiffs'"

private collection of qualified horseless carriages and classic
automobiles, while not a junkyard, constitutes the storage of
inoperable and rusted motor vehicles within the view, as well as

being within the boundaries o-F the distances prescribed by the
State o-F Utah's Junkyard Control Statute as set out in Section
27-12-137 o-f the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1965 and
27-12-137.3(3) o-f the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1967(3) "Automobile graveyard'1 means any
establishment or place o-f business which
is maintained, used or operated, -for
storing,
keeping, buying or selling
wrecked, scrapped, ruined or dismantled
motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts-"
H

it is necessary or desirable to screen such rusted and

inoperable motor vehicles -from public view, the authority to do so
is granted to a city having such a -facility within its corporate
limits provided the city enacts a valid ordinance which is uniform
in its application to all similarly situated citizens.

It could

even regulate the maintenance o-f an existing storage area such as
that owned by the PI ainti -f-f /Appel 1 ants in the case at bar -for
years prior to the existence o-f such an ordinance.

A myriad o-F

Federal case law cited in ALR FOURTH establishes beyond dispute
that a city must decide to either pay compensation to property
owners 1-f i t chooses to en-force its ordinance or decline to
enforce the ordinance all together.

It must necessarily -follow,

then, that even if the Lower Court's erroneous summary judgment
ruling is allowed to stand, it was an error by the Lower Court not
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the value o-f the
Plainti-f-f/Appellants* rights to exercise the incorporeal
hereditaments o-F their fee simple whether or not the same was ever
an accessory use in an agricultural zone, particularly where the
published deposition o-f the City Zoning Administrator states that
-8-

no other citizens o-f the City o-F Centerville have had their rights
to maintain inoperable, rusted, or partially dismantled motor
vehicles on their land in-fringed upon by the enforcement o-f the
ordinance against them at any time in the past, present, or
•future.
10.

Plaintiff/Appellant., J. VAL ROBERTS, is informed and does

believe that had the Lower Court conducted an evidentiary hearing,
it would have determined that one of the several reasons why the
CITY OF CENTERVILLE seeks to regulate no other property owner's
maintenance of inoperable or partially dismantled automobiles on
either their agricultural or residential property is that no other
property owners have a collection of automobiles as substantial as
that of the Plaintiff/Appellants on land that lies within less
than 400 feet of a major access to Interstate Highway 15; and that
both the enactment and the enforcement of the more recent
ordinances limiting an individual's right to maintain rusted,
inoperable, or partially dismantled vehicles on their property to
a period not in excess of 30 days was solicited or suggested or
encouraged by officials of District II of the Utah State
Department of Transportation so as to avoid the application of the
Federal Rules providing for screening of such storage areas.

The

District Court Judge's failure to take evidence on the major
issues going to the bona fides of the CITY'S actions are a
substantial abuse of discretion which can be verified by the
testimony given by JAMES G- PARRISH at the hearing conducted by
the CENTERVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT which was made a part of the
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record in the District Court.

In that testimony, the -former

Justice of the Peace stated, "If the Roberts's are in violation,
so am I because I've had that old stationwagon out in my -field
for years; and it is inoperable as well as rusty."
11.

The CITY OF CENTERVILLE is left with an ordinance which

it may apply to the storage of rusted or inoperable motor vehicles
which are

kept at distances from freeway accesses which are

greater than those prescribed by the applicable State Statute.
The State of Utah has exercised its jurisdiction and has funded
the screening of rusted and inoperable motor vehicles in
Richfield, Utah, through the application of Federal grants
specifically designated for this purpose.

The

Plaintiff/Appel1 ants in the case at bar have been denied, by the
actions of the CITY OF CENTERVILLE, the protections of the State
of Utah's Junkyard Control Act as well as the monetary benefits
and physical improvements to the land which the
Plaintiff/Appellants are using to store the Appellant, J. VAL
ROBERTS'S, private collection of rusted and inoperable motor
vehicles on the land owned jointly by the Plamti ff/Appel 1 ants in
fee simple thereby unconstitutionally differentiateing between the
Plaintiff/Appellant, J. VAL ROBERTS, and a similarly situated
citizen of Richfield, Utah, upon whose land the State has built a
12-foot high screening fence using Federal grants during the time
that the case at bar has been working its way through the Justice
of the Peace, Circuit, and District Courts.

Inasmuch as district

court judges, like ordinary citizens, are presumed to know the
-10-

Statutes o-f the State, it must be concluded that the HONORABLE
DAVID E. ROTH, erred and exceeded his discretion in granting
summary judgment to the Defendants in the case at bar when he
re-fused to resolve these and other issues o-f -fact as well as the
application o-f the Junkyard Control Act.

The decision o-f the

Lower Court should be reversed.
12.

The initiation o-f the prosecution o-f the

Plaintiff/Appellants in the case at bar by the Defendant, CITY OF
CENTERVILLE, beginning in approximately 1984 coincides more than
coincidentally with Plaintiff/Appellant, J. VAL RQBERTSnS, refusal
to donate to the CITY OF CENTERVILLE a portion of land four feet
wide by 100 feet long upon which the Defendant CITY sought to
place a public sidewalk under a State Department of Transportation
Highway Public Safety Grant, the terms of which specifically
precluded the Defendant, CITY OF CENTERVILLE, from applying any of
the funds to the purchase of the additional four feet of
right-of-way necessary to install the sidewalk and required
retaining wails-

Defendant, CITY OF CENTERVILLE'S City Manager,

DAVID HALE, stated in the presence of both of the
Plaintiff/Appellants and the Centerville City Attorney, KEITH M.
STAHLE, that the City had never

purchased right-of-way from

citizens when mating public improvements, that MARILYN SHERIFF and
other citizens were very angry that the Plaintiff/Appellants in
the case at bar along with FIVE (5) of the Plaintiff/Appellants'
neighbors would receive benefits valued in thousands of dollars
which SHERIFF and others had been required to pay for as part of
-11-

an improvement district on the opposite side o-f State Highway 106
utilizing right-of-way already owned by the State o-f Utah,

HALE

also stated that the City Council did not want to start a
precedent o-f purchasing private property -for public use in such
situations.

Neither did the Council want to upset MARILYN SHERIFF

and others by purchasing land -from the Plainti f -f /Appel lants in the
case at bar.

The ongoing attack by the Defendant, CITY OF

CENTERVILLE, against PIaintiff/Appellants as individuals, as a
married couple, and the involvement o-f the Plaintiff/Appel 1 ants'
minor children by the officials o-f the City as guided by the
suggestions o-f the District II Office o-f the State Department o-f
Transportation and carried on to the present date by criminal
in-formation signed by the current Justice o-f the Peace o-f the City
o-f Centerville, who was a member o-f the City Council that directed
Zoning Administrator RANDY RANDALL to investigate and follow up on
the earlier prosecution, not only violates the
Plainti -f-f /Appel 1 ants' rights to equal protection o-f the law,
renders the ordinance unenforceable as applied, but is also a
denial of the separation of powers doctrine as addressed by REX E.
LEE5 former Solicitor General of the United States and former Dean
of the B.Y.U- Law School, in Chapter 4 of his book, A_Lawyer_Lggks
at_ t he_Con st it utign ;, published by the B.Y.U. Press and copyrighted
in 1981.

A copy of the most recent criminal information issued by

the former City Council member against the Plaintiff/Appellant, J.
VAL ROBERTS, is attached to this Docketing Statement as Exhibit
"B. "

13.

De-Fendant, CITY OF CENTERVILLE, seeks to cause

Plainti-f-f/Appellant, J, VAL ROBERTS, to -forfeit his accumulation
o-f horseless carriages, antique automobiles, and classic cars as
punishment -for -Failure to cooperate in a sidewalk sa-fety
improvement project on State Road 106.

The De-fendant, CITY OF

CENTERVILLE, has consulted with and been guided by suggestions
•from o-f-ficials within District II o-f the State Department o-f
Transportation.

The issues o-f -fact raised here would have been

-fully addressed in an evidentiary hearing in the District Court
but -for the Court's -failure to enter a proper ruling denying the
De-fendant CITY'S motion -for summary judgment, and this Honorable
Court should remand the matter -for such hearing as a part o-f its
order.
14.

On at least THREE (3) prior occasions when

Plainti-f-f/Appellant, J. VAL ROBERTS, has resisted donating land to
the Citv or has represented clients against power-Ful departments
o-f State Government or influential individuals, whether in
administrative hearings or juvenile court, some governmental or
guasi governmental agenc/ such as LEE FOFD o-f the Utah Attorney
General's 0-f-fice, the Utah State Bar in the person o-f its -farmer
Bar Counsel, now the HONORABLE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, has initiated
such things as letters -from the District Engineer threatening
prosecution for maintaining a visual obstruction on a public
highway or an uninvestigated and un-founded Bar Association
complaint which, a-fter Plamti-f-f/Appel 1 ant retained eminent legal
counsel, was dismissed as being un-founded, are more than
su-f-ficient reasons why the un-favorable reflection on the -fair and
-17-

impartial administration o-f justice, the negative connotation
which could be drawn -From the actions o-f the Plaintiff /Appel 1 ant" s
professional association as well as the investigative skill and/or
discretion o-f a sitting judge o-f the Appellate Court why this
Honorable Court should place this matter under seal, should
conduct any -future hearings in camera, and should not exercise its
discretion to transfer the matter to the Utah Court o-f Appeals.
15.

Until such time as the Plamti ff/Appel lant, J. VAL

ROBERTS, can secure -from his -former counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD, the
exhibits which will support the allegations o-f the previous
paragraph as to himself, the PI amtiff/Appel lant, J. VAL ROBERTS,
o-f-fers the -following observations -from current events.

He is

informed and does believe that other lawyers and judges whose
actions have incurred the displeasure of persons with financial or
political influence have, likewise, been subjected to complaints
and other forms of intimidation; but he knows of no other person
whose wife has been drawn into the attempt to limit his
representation via criminal prosecution and the attempted
destruction of the PIaintiff/Appel1 ants' marriage as in the case
at bar.

The unfounded complaint again SENATOR LORIN PACE for his

vigorous representation in the Larsen bankruptcy and the unrefuted
public comments of the HONORABLE DAVID S. VQUNG, a Judge of the
Third Judicial District, to the effect that he had been threatened
by other judges, legislators, an unspecified persons for his
ruling on attorney's fees in the State thrift case are only two
(2) of the more recent examples which would justify the Utah
-14-

Supreme Court in retaining jurisdiction of this matter and in
placing the entire -file under seal and conducting hearings on
motions which may hereafter be -filed in camera.

Such is the

request of the Plaint if f/Appel lant, J. VAL ROBERTS.
\ .

Dated this 15th day of February, 19?<X"

J./J/AL ROBERTSx
A t t o r n e y a t Law

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DOCKETING STATEMENT, postage prepaid,, this
, 1990, to the following:

day of

Jody Burnett and Daniel

D. Hill, Attorneys for Defendants, P. 0. Box 45000, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84145.

J.; VAL" ROBERTS "~
Attorney at Law
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DESERET NEWS, W.dn.idoy, Augwt 18, 1971

Town Order* Removal Of Antique Auto
By WANDA 1<UND
Deseret News Staff Writer
FARMINGTON — A man
*ho ha* been collecting antique automobiles since 1939
has been ordered to rid himself of the old vehicles before
Aug 28.
He is Melville B. Held Sr.,
ft. 547 N Main, who has collected 22 Model A Fords and
numerous other old automobiles He keeps 20 of h 1 a
Model A s on his Farmington
property, a 1 Vi acre lot
When he first came to
FrrminRion in 1941 he had alread) collected a 1923 Essex,
a 192.1 Packard Phaeton and a
1914 DeSoio Airflow, and be
has added to this collection
oxer the years.
•*l ve been notified by letter
that I must get rid of {be obsolete vehicles' 1 have or I
will be fined or put In Jail,"
he said " I won't pay a fine 1
will let them put me In Jail,
i f I have to, I will get
enough licenses to put on that
whole string of cars," he said.
" I am going to keep my
Model A V
He said fee has a special

An Eyesore? Farmington says so, and has ordered owner to remove cars.
fondness for the cars and
never wants to sell them "as
long as I have enough to eat
"When 1 get hungry, 111 sell
them," he said.
He was told In a form letter
that Farmington City has had

a zoning ordinance since December, 1957, and t h a t he
would have to get rid of his
obsolete cars.
"This ordinance was adopt
ed for the express purpose of
insuring that the community

would grow In an orderly
fashion and that the beauty
and desirability of Farmington
would be constantly improved," the letter aaid in
part
Held retained an attorney to

represent his Interests. In a
letter to Jay Johnson, city
zoning administrator, the attorney, Bill Thomas Peters,
said the Held family had
moved onto the property November 15, 1941 with three

cars and had continu
quire other vehidi
then "The ordinance
seek to enforce agf
Held was not passec
years and one month
time that Mr
lit
menced using his la
manner above descr
wrote
"Under the law,
opinion that Mr He
nonconforming use, t
nonconforming use
scribed as the use o
building thrit existe
uhrn the zoning i
became effective an<1
continued to exist c
time
"The action vou
take against Mr I
been held to be a vi
constitutional rights
tected by the UniM
Constitution and cer
protected by the Oc
of the State of Utah '
He said zoning o
must permit the coi
of nonconforming use
tente at the time
nance was enacted.

FEB - 8 BPO

£xW;b}4 " 8 "
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768)
HANSON, EPPERSON fc SMITH
Attorney for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephones (801) 363-7611
IS TEE JUSTICE'S COURT IK AND FOR CEHTEKvTLLB C U T
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INFORMATION

CENTERVILLE CITY,
Plaintiff,
V8,

J. VAL ROBERTS
499 North Main
Centerville, Utah

84014
Criminal No.: 89-0668

Defendants.

On this 1st day of February, 1990, before me, Jerald L.
Jensen, Justice of the Peace within and for Centerville City,
Davis County, State of Utah, personally appeared Randy Randall
who being duly sworn by me, on his oath, complains and says that
the Defendant, J. Val Roberts on the 29th day of June, 1987, and
every day thereafter until December 31, 1988 at Centerville City,
Davis County, Utah did commit the offenses of violating Section
10-354

(as

it amended 7-5-4) Code of Revised Ordinances of

Centerville, 1985 Revision, as follows, to-wit:

That the said J. Val Roberts at the times mentioned
above

and

at

two

locations

within

the

boundary

limits

of

Centerville City, 499 North Main (more particularly described ast
Beginning at a point 406 feet North from the Southeast Corner of
Lot lf Block *B" Big Creek Plat, Centerville Townsite Survey and
running thence North 89 feet} thence West 262.41 feet; thence
South

89

feet;

thence

Bast

262.41

feet

to

the

point

of

beginning) and 59 Vest 550 North (more particularly described as
followst

All of Lot 27, Meadow Spring Subdivision, Plat "B", a

subdivision of part of Section 7, Township 2 North, Range 1 Bast,
Salt Lake Meridian), Centerville City did:
1.

Park, store, leave, or permit parking, storing, or

leaving any motor vehicle of any kind which is in an abandoned,
wrecked, dismantled, inoperative, rusted, junked, or partially
dismantled condition whether attended or not for more than seven
days, as more particularly described in Centerville City Code 10354 •
Each of the above violations occurred on every day
during the period before mentioned on each parcel of property and
each day of occurrence constitutes a separate violation for each
parcel of property all contrary to the provisions of the Revised
Ordinances

aforesaid,

in

such

cases made

and

against the peace and dignity of Centerville City.

2

provided, and

Witnesst

Randy Randall, Kevin Taylor, Richaard Leonard,

Carl Allen, Glen Crosby, John Toronto, and David Bales.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before ms this
^..Ui^yL

l*A

day of

. 1990.
ft nr-fli \ m
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